

European Initiative

for the exchange of young officers inspired by Erasmus

**The
Initiative**

**Essays
for the
8th CSDP
Olympiad
(exclusions?)**

**Erasmus
Militaire**

EMILYO

**Military
Erasmus**

Agenda

Procedure
Plagiarism
Check

Statements

Case 1
(written by Tutor)

Case 2
(no Citations)

Case 3
(wrong Topic)

Case 4
(no Chance)

Procedure for Plagiarism Check

- Out of all 45 essays – all quoted/cited parts were deleted (sentences or paragraphs).
- The “*remaining rest*” was checked with a plagiarism programme (“*Turnitin*” = official programme of the AT MoD).
- All electronically marked parts were checked again → evaluated if **yes** or **no**.
- Per 1 plagiarism part: **-5 points**.

Agenda

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Case 3
(wrong Topic)

Case 4
(no Chance)

8. Research and results of research

8.1 The dangers of disinformation and misinformation

8.1.1 How is disinformation disseminated

The easiest way that misinformation and disinformation can be distributed is by social media. In this day and age, the internet is a place where everybody can post whatever they want and due to the social media algorithm, it can be spread rapidly in the platform. Each social media platform has got its own algorithm. In general, social media algorithms work by tracking user interactions, likes, shares, behaviour and actions to recommend relevant content.⁶ In the context of misinformation, the algorithm continues to feed misinformation to users who engage with it and these users are unlikely to be presented with information that discredits or corrects it. As a result, social media users are shown an incomplete view of the scope of content published on a platform, whereby content that may challenge or oppose their beliefs is omitted.⁷

Additionally, misinformation and disinformation can be spread by accounts who have large followings. If a false information post catches the eye of one of these accounts and they decide to share it too, it can be viewed and interacted by lots of people. This leads to the algorithm promoting the post and distributing it among the platform.⁸ These “content creators” can also spread disinformation deliberately, with a financial reward, by actors who want to push propaganda and manipulate public masses.⁹ These actors take advantage of the large number of followers of these accounts, knowing that their false narratives can be spread rapidly through their following. This technique has been used by Russia, where according to the US Department of Justice some of the biggest stars in right-wing social media were, unwittingly, part of a sinister Russian operation to influence

6 Cf: Homepage of Sprout Social. Page: Everything you need to know about social media algorithms. URL: <https://sproutsocial.com/insights/social-media-algorithms/>. [27-6-25]

7 Denniss, E. & Lindberg R. (2025) Social media and the spread of misinformation: infectious and a threat to public health. Health Promotion International, Volume 40, Issue 2.

8 Homepage of BBC. Page: How false information spreads. URL: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/articles/zcr8r2p> [30-6-25]

9 Cf: Denniss, E. & Lindberg R. (2025). Social media and the spread of misinformation: infectious and a threat to public health. Op. Cit. P. 12

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8.1.2 Core dangers for the CSDP

The success of these operations depends on fostering trust in the European Union's institutions, particularly in the CSDP missions organized by EEAS. This trust, though, can be heavily damaged by some factors. Disinformation and misinformation seriously undermine mutual trust, both within the European Union and in its external relations. Disinformation and misinformation have the potential to manipulate a large group of people and has severe dangers for the CSDP missions, which I identify as the following:

1. Erosion of public trust and institutional credibility



Procedure

for Plagiarism Check – detailed Examples

69th IG-Meeting
4
03-04 March 2026

Agenda

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(wrong Topic)

Case 4
(no Chance)

12
13
Europe bodies treat disinformation as a hybrid threat, that affect the execution of the CSDP missions. It is framed under Foreign Information Manipulation Interference (FIMI), which is a challenge mainly addressed by the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS has produced multiple reports, researches and guidance documents on

NO

4
In the context of misinformation, the algorithm continues to feed misinformation to users who engage with it and these users are unlikely to be presented with information that discredits or corrects it.

YES

1
8.2.1 The Code of Practice on Disinformation
The Code of Practice on Disinformation is a pioneering framework to address the spread of disinformation, agreed upon by a number of relevant stakeholders. Established in 2018, the Code of Practice was significantly strengthened in 2022, with the aim of becoming recognised as a Code of Conduct under the Digital Services Act (DSA)

YES



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Statement 1: Each Cadet / Midshipman / Student has to sign ...

I declare that I have written the present essay independently and on my own. I have clearly marked any language or ideas borrowed from other sources as not my own and documented their sources. The essay does not contain any work that I have handed in or have had graded as a previous scientific paper earlier on.

I am aware that any failure to do so constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism is the presentation of another person's thoughts or words as if they were my own – even if I summarise, paraphrase, condense, cut, rearrange, or otherwise alter them.

I am aware of the consequences and sanctions plagiarism entails. Among others, consequences may include nullification of the essay, exclusion from participation in the CSDP Olympiad. These consequences also apply retrospectively, i.e., if plagiarism is discovered after the essay has been accepted and graded. I am fully aware of the scope of these consequences.

Signature

.....

(Rank Academic Degree Forename Family name, Academic Degree)

Location, Country (e.g.: Wroclaw, Poland) in November 2025



Statement 2:

Regulation for the CSDP Olympiad

69th IG-Meeting

6

03-04 March 2026

Agenda

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Statements

Case 1

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Case 2

(no Citations)

Case 3

(wrong Topic)

Case 4

(no Chance)

- **In the regulation nowhere is written that a student cannot use a tutor.**
- **However, we conclude that students write their essays on their own!**

Almost **EVERYTHING** was written/corrected by a Tutor

69th IG-Meeting
7
03-04 March 2026

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(no Chance)

3. → Introduction ¶

~~With After fighting in both the Pacific and European theatres in the Second World War, including the North African Campaign, the United States of America (USA) emerged victorious at the end of World War II. The USA lost approximately 400,000 soldiers in Europe the end of the Second World War, the United States of America (USA) came out on top as a total victor. Fighting in both the European theatre, which includes the North African Campaign, and the Pacific theatre of war. In Europe, the USA lost around 400 thousand~~

Vorschlag annehmen oder ablehnen?

using such a powerful weapon, the one the world had never seen before, altered everyone's perception of the American commitment and power. The United States was the single source of this mind-boggling power that had been operationally tested and used. It was truly the pinnacle of their ...

30.10.2025 14:09:00

~~land-hopping campaign in the Pacific, which accounts for 28% of the total casualties. Their main concern of the day was taking too long to get to reach Japan, i.e., and make simultaneously, the United States Americans is were also and technology on the battlefield to make a difference. power and material to make create what is today known and used twice twice on the country of Japan, after ing in the Japanese surrender and finally the end put an~~

The act of using such a powerful weapon, the one the world had never seen before, altered everyone's perception of the American commitment and power. The United States was the single source of this mind-boggling power that had been operationally tested and used. It was truly the pinnacle of their technological dominance. ¶

The sole act of deploying such a powerful weapon the world had never seen before, altered everyone's perceived commitment and strength of the USA. At that moment, they became the only bearer of mind-boggling power that was in use and operationally tested. It was truly the height of their technological domination. ¶

The US had to regulate the usage of this kind of technology since authority comes with responsibility. Questions began to surface. The American government also had to figure out how to control and store the radioactive material so that it doesn't harm the environment.

be applied to non-military uses. ¶

~~With power also comes responsibility, which meant they needed to regulate this type of technology. Questions start to emerge: How does one store and control radioactive material and ensure its quality does not affect the environment? Later, this technology was also experimented upon to provide a steady source of energy, hence its civil application until today. ¶~~

~~Several other nations, including France, the United Kingdom (UK), Russia, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, have also acquired nuclear weapons as a result of political and technological advancements over the past 80 years. Although Israel's official stance on this matter is one of deliberate ambiguity – that is, neither confirming nor denying its possession of those weapons – it is nevertheless regarded as a nation with nuclear capabilities. In actuality, alliances and~~

Vorschlag annehmen oder ablehnen?

ment of nuclear weapons also highlights the necessity of establishing guidelines for when and how to use them. Every nation possessing nuclear weapons must have a doctrine for their use and purpose. Does the nation use its nuclear weapons for defence? Or to defend its allies? What conse...

30.10.2025 14:27:00

~~to change, particularly in the modern era. As a result, ally to everyone. ¶~~

~~development of the past 80 years, a number of other weapons, such as France, the United Kingdom (UK), and Israel, are also considered a country with nuclear weapons. The point being, if possession of those weapons, especially today. As such, not all the other. ¶~~

The development of nuclear weapons also highlights the necessity of establishing guidelines for when and how to use them. Every nation possessing nuclear weapons must have a doctrine for their use and purpose. Does the nation use its nuclear weapons for defence? Or to defend its allies? What consequences do those policies have? Furthermore, how do they integrate with other nuclear weapons prohibition treaties? The author will attempt to address some of these questions and provide information regarding one of the more covert aspects of a country's defence strategies. The development of nuclear weapons also points to a need to have a policy on how to use them and in what circumstances, or expressed more precisely,

¶ Cf. Homepage of Geopolitical Monitor. URL: <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/strategic-ambiguity-israels-nuclear-program-and-begin-doctrine/> [21-10-25] ¶



Case 1

Almost **EVERYTHING** was written/corrected by a Tutor

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
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(wrong Topic)

Case 4
(no Chance)

Red text = written by a tutor




Almost **EVERYTHING** was written/corrected by a Tutor

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Case 4
(no Chance)

Case 1 (written by tutor)	
Exclusion?	
Yes	No




Case 2

NOT ANY Citations / Quotations

Skills and Competences Achieved through the Military Erasmus (EMILYO) Exchange: A Driver for European Military Interoperability

Day



Abstract

The study analyses the skills and competences developed through the Military Erasmus (EMILYO) programme, focusing on the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) programme interoperability and shared defence identity among European officers. Through document analysis (EMILYO Charter, ESDC Annual Report, Council Conclusions on Security and Defence and other strategic documents) during a full EMILYO mobility in the Croatian Defence Academy (CDA) Spring 2024, November 2024, the paper assesses how EMILYO developed operational skills, leadership and communication, leadership self-awareness on ground visit, and a European Officer Mindset. These competences directly support the achievement of national operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and contribute to the long-term objective of European Strategic Autonomy.

Keywords:

ESDC; EMILYO; Interoperability; Military education; Military autonomy

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2. Essay: Skills and Competences Achieved through the Military Erasmus (EMILYO) Exchange: A Driver for European Military Interoperability

2.1. Abstract 1

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2.1 Introduction

The overall Erasmus mobility programme is characterised by high-level mobility to the EU's neighbourhood, and the need for rapid and targeted adjustments under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and within the NATO framework. For such missions to succeed, European armed forces must be able to plan and execute together effectively.

In 2016, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) launched the initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers (EYO) between EU Member States – already known as EMILYO – to support this requirement. The EMILYO Charter explicitly states its intention after education and "to ensure interoperability among its members from all Member States".

The mobility begins in a traditional manner: European military together in a visit to the respective host nation for an official or business assignment. The core mission is to ensure interoperability among its members from all Member States through EMILYO exchanges, and how do they contribute to European defence interoperability?

2.2 Problem

As an officer under the Serbian Army, participating in the Military Erasmus (EMILYO) programme at the Croatian Defence Academy (CDA) in Zagreb in November 2024, I have seen full mobility (I had received studies and had to complete with foreign units from several European and US academies).

From a first-day, I became clear that leadership was no longer (primarily) rank or national identity. It is a multifaceted experience, carefully learned through experience, communication, and visibility. The experience is shaped by an acronym that "One Single is usually hard" for my national identity and required me to diffuse aggression in training, planning, and tactical thinking.

For me, this may be not only an academic mission; it is also a reflection of a personal EMILYO's shared belief.

Interoperability is not a goal in itself – it is a means to an end.

For this to happen, we have to have a high level of interoperability as a European officer

Page 1 of 10

2.3 Current State of Research

Analysis literature and ESDC's institutional documents supports the importance of common education for building interoperability. The ESDC Annual Report 2024 notes the need for high-quality military training opportunities in EMILYO activities, including mobility exchanges, communication, and shared EMILYO activities, linking activities directly that leads to interoperability. The ESDC is expected to continue.

2.4 Operational planning and general problem – the ability to plan together for the capability to do different functions and conduct operations.

2.5 Interpersonal communication – the use of English as an operational language and the nature of relationships in a multicultural environment.

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2.6 Methodology

The methodology of this study is qualitative and involves data triangulation through:

1. Document analysis

Official documents related to the EMILYO programme were reviewed, including the EMILYO Charter, the ESDC Annual Report from 2017 to 2024, and the Council Conclusions on Security and Defence of March 2022. This section provides the theoretical framework and contextualises the EMILYO's role.

2. Interviews

The European Officer Community (EOC) and other external references were consulted to identify which competences are expected from officers in

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2.7 Research and results of Research

The analysis of the English mobility and the relevant documents shows two main clusters of competences developed through EMILYO:

- Operational competences
- Interpersonal communication competences

2.8 Operational competences

Officers participated in several visits based on planning and training operations in which national teams, such as:

- joint planning and execution;
- mission and coordination exercises;
- decision-making under fire exercises.

In a traditional manner, when usually involve more activities, communication, and tactical operations. During EMILYO's 10th annual celebration documents. When a

Page 1 of 10

2.9 Interpersonal communication competences

The working language during the mobility was English. However, most communication did not occur face-to-face, but through different digital operations. For example, some activities required very detailed notes, which were required to be shared with other units within the host nation.

To make this work, units had to:

- explain their meaning, usually after training;
- check understanding through a feedback loop;
- adapt their communication style to a different set of expectations.

Through repeated briefings, debriefings, and informal discussions, leaders improved their ability to present plans clearly and to ask questions to support critical decision-making.

Results: General staff communication involves explicit, structured, and standardised, which directly supports national operations.

2.10 Leadership competences leadership without rank

In EMILYO exchanges, leaders from different countries join the same team without leading directly, much rather with requirements, guidance, performance, or positive reinforcement. Formal hierarchy is less visible.

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2.10 Leadership competences leadership without rank

The study of the research can be summarised into two main clusters of competences: operational planning, interpersonal communication, and leadership in a multicultural environment.

The final goal of leadership refers to various operational principles described in NATO doctrine, including shared intent, initiative, and responsibility under time and uncertainty.

Results: EMILYO's leadership involves shared intent and shared responsibility under time and uncertainty.

2.11 Competence matrix

The development of competences is analysed as follows:

Competence	Formal level	Formal level	Formal level
	Interoperability	Interoperability	Interoperability
Operational planning	Medium	High	Personal planning and execution
Interpersonal communication	Medium	High	Dialogical and dialogical (in English)
Leadership without rank	Medium	Very high	Orientation: task and group decision-making
Adaptability under stress	Medium	High	Task-oriented planning and field activities

The study illustrates how EMILYO contributes to the development of competences that are particularly relevant to national operations.

2.12 Key finding

The final goal of the research can be summarised into two main clusters of competences: operational planning, interpersonal communication, and leadership in a multicultural environment.

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2.13 Link to European Strategic Autonomy

The Council Conclusions on Security and Defence (March 2022) state that "to build strategic autonomy requires interoperability". This is essential to enable us to build EMILYO's interoperability.

European Strategic Autonomy requires:

- interoperability of forces;
- the ability of European forces to operate together with NATO;
- a generation of officers who understand both national and European levels of military policy.

By training European officers together in common frameworks, EMILYO contributes to these dimensions. In European strategic autonomy is not only about capabilities and equipment; it is also about the ability to train and improve decision-making.

EMILYO's function focuses on a regularity training instrument, linking the forces' competences of European defence.

2.14 Final conclusion

In conclusion, EMILYO's mobility is not only a simple tactical mission. They are a key element in building the future European officer corps. Through shared activities, training, and daily life, units develop operational, interpersonal, and leadership competences necessary for multinational operations under the CSDF and NATO.

From the other perspective, the experience in Zagreb demonstrated that:

- leadership can be learned without rank;
- communication needs clear and explicit in each scenario;
- a European Officer Mindset is not a rigid dogma, but a reality that is slowly being built.

Shared defence needs with shared responsibility.

In this sense, EMILYO's mobility is not only an operational programme, but a cultural mission to build a European officer corps.

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2.17 Abstract

This document serves as a reference against which the study can be evaluated.

2.18 Purpose

The study aims to identify EMILYO's exchange at the Croatian Defence Academy in Zagreb in November 2024. During this visit, activities were recorded in a structured way, including national exercises, planning sessions, activities, shared intent, and communication with foreign units from several European and US academies.

The conclusion of this study demonstrates that the mobility is not only a tactical mission, but also a cultural mission that contributes to the development of competences necessary for multinational operations under the CSDF and NATO.

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Case 2
(no Citations)

Case 3
(wrong Topic)

Case 4
(no Chance)

<h2>Case 2 (not any citations)</h2> <p>Not any plagiarism → written with AI?</p>	
<h3>Exclusion?</h3>	
Yes	No

Changed Title – already existing Document?

Agenda

- Procedure Plagiarism Check
- Statements
- Case 1 (written by Tutor)
- Case 2 (no Citations)
- Case 3 (wrong Topic)**
- Case 4 (no Chance)

- **Statement on the registration form:**
*“Important remark:
Cadets / Midshipmen / Students have to select **one** out of the following 10 topics.
It is **not allowed** to hand-in **own topics** or **adaptions** of the listed 10 topics.”*
- **Selected (original) title no. 4: “The danger of disinformation and misinformation for the Common Security and Defence Policy”**
- **Real / written title: “Cross-Lingual Diffusion of Misinformation in the EU: Structural Patterns and Vulnerabilities”**



Changed Title – already existing Document?

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7.3. Structural Indicators

Two simple measures summarise the structural po

- **Outgoing influence** $O_j = \sum_{i \neq j} c_{ij}$: how spreads.
- **Incoming exposure** $I_i = \sum_{j \neq i} c_{ij}$: how originating elsewhere.

A simplified form of this dynamic can be expressed as a dif

$$\frac{dI_i(t)}{dt} = \sum_j c_{ij} I_j(t) - \gamma_i I_i(t)$$

where:

- $I_i(t)$ = intensity of a claim or narrative circulating in language i
- c_{ij} = cross-lingual coupling coefficient (effective transmission from language j to i ;
- c_{ii} = language i inner (mis)information spread (in case of $j = i$; generally marked by β_i)
- γ_i = decay rate (how fast the narrative loses visibility in language i)

1. English shows low incoming influence
English receives almost no translated or re-adapted claims. This reflects its upstream position in the information hierarchy.
2. Slavic languages are comparatively exposed to one another
Polish, Czech, Slovak, and Romanian show moderate incoming values that largely mirror their outgoing patterns. This creates a regional cluster of shared exposure.
3. Hungarian, Finnish, and Lithuanian results are unreliable
These languages appear in too few clusters for any meaningful estimation. Their high incoming ratios result from denominator effects (e.g., 1 transition / 1 cluster = 100% incoming). This reflects a core weakness of the dataset, not a true exposure pattern.
Therefore, although the matrix provides initial structural insights, interpretations for small languages must be avoided until better datasets become available.

84.5 points



Changed Title – already existing Document?

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
Case 3 (changed title)	
Exclusion?	
Yes	No



Low Points – no Chance to win anything

- Points from the essay = 33
- Minus 6 plagiarism points = **-30** = 3 final points
- Current final points of all:

92,50	82,50	76,50	64,00	31,50
92,00	82,00	73,50	61,00	29,00
90,50	82,00	73,00	59,75	21,00
87,50	81,00	72,00	57,50	10,50
87,00	80,50	70,50	55,50	3,00
85,00	80,00	68,00	50,50	
84,50	80,00	67,00	48,50	
84,25	78,50	64,50	40,75	
84,00	78,00	64,50	36,00	
83,00	76,75	64,00	32,00	



Agenda

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Case 4 (low points / 6 x plagiarism)	
Exclusion?	
Yes	No

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and Defence College



**Thank YOU
for YOUR
attention &
contribution!**

