

**“Protecting Europe” and the CSDP within the hybrid war context: implications of Russia’s information operations in the Baltics and beyond**

**Sergeant  
Robin Kinnunen  
ENDC Officers School  
Estonia**



**ESTONIAN NATIONAL  
DEFENCE COLLEGE**

# Table of contents

- Introduction
- Russia's information warfare
- Research questions
- Methodology
- The main narratives of Russian information warfare
- CSDP, the EU and Russia through Frederking
- Conclusion



# Introduction

- Russia's recent actions
- „Hybrid warfare“
- EU needs to raise its resilience through quality CSDP



RUSSIA, PAST AND PRESENT

Picture: URL

<<http://www.newpolcom.rhul.ac.uk/npcu-blog/2017/12/7/information-warfare-if-sun-tsu-had-the-internet>>

- As they said in the “A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy” paper: *“Only the combined weight of a true union has the potential to deliver security, prosperity and democracy to its citizens and make a positive difference in the world”*



ESTONIAN NATIONAL  
DEFENCE COLLEGE


# Russia's information warfare

- Ulrik Franke – Not only a matter of the Armed Forces
- Keir Giles – channels and methods for conducting information warfare cover an equally broad range
- Both agree that information operations are capable of addressing highly ambitious „strategic tasks“
- Andrew Radin confirms that the analysts generally agree that there is a low-level nonviolent subversion currently happening in the Baltic states



# Research Questions

- What are the main narratives of Russian information warfare in the Baltics?
- What is the impact of Russia's information warfare against the Baltics and, by way of generalisation, what implications it has for the character of the EU and for the CSDP's basic role within the EU?



Picture: URL

<<https://toinformistoinfluence.com/2018/03/08/russian-information-warfare-is-not-slown-down/>>



ESTONIAN NATIONAL  
DEFENCE COLLEGE

# Methodology

- Identification of key Russian information warfare targets and narratives through frequency of occurrence
- Frederking's classification of international security systems (*War, Rivalry, Collective Security, Security Community*)



# Baltics

- Restoration of independence – 1991
- EU & NATO members since 2004
- Russian minorities:
  - Estonia – 24% (30%)
  - Latvia – 27% (34%)
  - Lithuania – 6% (8%)



# The main narratives of Russian information warfare

- NATO's enhanced presence
- Military exercises
- Historical aspects
- Discrimination of Russian minorities



Picture: URL <<https://www.economist.com/europe/2015/03/19/aux-ames-journalistes>>



ESTONIAN NATIONAL  
DEFENCE COLLEGE



# Frederking's table on global security social arrangements

**TABLE 1. Global Security Social Arrangements**

	War	Rivalry	Collective Security	Security Community
Rule 1—Identity	We are enemies	We are rivals	We are fellow citizens	We are friends
Rule 2—Autonomy	We do not recognize the autonomy of others	We recognize the autonomy of others	Autonomy is limited by obligations to follow and enforce the community's rules	Autonomy is limited by obligations to follow the community's rules
Rule 3—Security	Survival is based on relative (alliance) military capability	Security is based on relative (alliance) military capability	Security is based on a multilateral commitment to use military capability	Security is based on political relationships
Rule 4—Deterrence	You must surrender	Do not attack me	Do not break the rules of our community	Do not break the rules of our community
Rule 5—Enforcement	We will attack until you surrender	We will retaliate if you violate our sovereignty	We will retaliate if you break the rules of our community	We will resolve conflicts peacefully
Rule 6—Use of force	The use of force is always necessary to resolve conflicts	The use of force is sometimes necessary	The use of force is sometimes necessary	The use of force is not acceptable

**Picture:** Frederking, B. (2003). Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security. P. 368. The American Political Science Review. Vol. 97, No. 3



# CSDP, the EU and Russia through Frederking

- EU -> *Security Community*
- Russia -> *Rivalry* or even the *War* regime
- Russia's goal -> EU *Collective security / Rivalry*
  
- CSDP categorizes rather in the *Collective Security*
- For it to move towards *Security Community* it needs to become more supranational



# Personal conclusion

- Estonia and Latvia are easier targets because of their population of ethnic Russians
- Information operations create unwanted tensions
- No actual pattern -> personal approach
- EU's drift away from *Security Community* could seriously threaten its existence
- CSDP needs to become more supranational



**Thank you for your attention!**  
**Questions ?**



Picture: URL

<https://toinformistoinfluence.com/2014/12/24/how-russia-views-us-and-uk-information-warfare/>



ESTONIAN NATIONAL  
DEFENCE COLLEGE